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ABSTRACT
      This paper analyzes the international reserve-holding behavior of developing countries. It shows
that political-economy considerations modify the optimal reserve level determined by efficiency
criteria. A country characterized by volatile output, inelastic demand for fiscal outlays, high tax
collection costs and sovereign risk will want to accumulate international reserves as well as external
debt. Efficiency considerations imply that reserves are optimal when the benefits they provide for
intertemporal consumption and distortion smoothing equal the costs of acquiring them. However,
a greater chance of opportunistic behavior by future policy makers reduces the demand for
international reserves and increases external borrowing. Political corruption also reduces optimal
reserve holdings. We provide some evidence to support these findings. Consequently, the debt-to-
reserves ratio may be less useful as a vulnerability indicator. A version of the Lucas Critique
suggests that if a high debt-to-reserves ratio is a symptom of opportunistic behavior, a policy
recommendation to increase international reserve holdings may be welfare-reducing.
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Over the past fifteen years, developing countries have increased their participation 
in international financial markets and faced new challenges. In the aftermath of the 1997-
98 Asian financial crises, some observers have called on emerging markets to reduce 
short-term external debt relative to international reserve holdings in order to lower their 
vulnerability to crisis.  Countries such as Korea, Taiwan and Chile have managed to build 
up large stockpiles of foreign-currency reserves in recent years.  Does it follow that all 
developing countries would benefit from increasing their cushion of international 
reserves to signal they are safe borrowers?   As the Lucas Critique suggests, this question 
cannot be answered without understanding the underlying factors that determine a 
country’s choice of international reserve holdings. 
We illustrate this point using a model where both efficiency and political-
economy considerations play roles in determining a country’s optimal holdings of 
international reserves.  In the absence of political-economy considerations, a country 
characterized by volatile output, inelastic demand for fiscal outlays, high tax collection 
costs and sovereign risk will want to accumulate both international reserves and external 
debt.  External debt allows the country to smooth consumption when output is volatile.  
International reserves, if they are beyond the reach of creditors, allow the country to 
smooth consumption in the event of a default on the external debt that results in lost 
access to international capital markets.
1  
Domestic political uncertainty can modify the country’s strategy.   Suppose 
governments can alternate between a “tough” administration that enforces the planned 
fiscal allocation and a “soft” administration that behaves opportunistically, “looting” the 
combined assets of the treasury and central bank to channel additional resources towards 
narrow interest groups with high discount rates.  If the present administration is “soft”, it 
has little incentive to accumulate international reserves and carry them over to the future. 
It prefers to reduce international reserve holdings and increase international borrowing in 
order to maximize the current consumption of special interest groups.  If the present 
                                                 
1 International reserves thus provide insurance in case of default.  For more on the 
insurance value of international reserves, see Van Wijnbergen (1990). 
 2 administration is “tough”, it may also be reluctant to accumulate international reserves if 
there is a high probability that the future administration will be “soft” and grab these 
reserves for favored insiders.  Political instability, by taxing the effective return on 
reserves, can thus reduce desired current reserve holdings below the level supported by 
efficiency considerations.  In the same way, political corruption acts as a tax on the return 
to holding reserves and reduces optimal holdings.  
If a high external debt-to-reserve ratio is a symptom of political instability or 
corruption, then a policy recommendation to increase international reserve holdings in 
order to reduce that ratio may be welfare reducing.  Indeed, increasing international 
reserves may increase the chance of financial crisis rather than reduce it.  
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we illustrate the 
confusion surrounding the appropriate level of reserves to hold by describing the current 
debate in Korea.  In Section 3 we examine the empirical literature for the consensus view 
about determinants of reserve demand.  We also present some new evidence suggesting 
reserves are held to insure against external shocks but may be reduced by political 
economy considerations.  In Section 4 we present a model that shows how optimal 
international reserve holdings are sensitive to both efficiency and political economy 
concerns.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Korea’s Debate About Optimal Reserve Holdings 
South Korea has the fifth largest holdings of international reserves in the world.  
Only Japan, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong hold more. Reserves now account for about 
20 percent of its GNP, compared with about 7 percent in 1996 and at the start of the 
1990s.  Reserves now cover more than 30 weeks of its imports, up from 11.8 weeks in 
1996 and 12.9 weeks at the start of the 1990s.  In January, 2002, South Korea’s reserve 
holdings (excluding gold) were $104 billion, a remarkable turnaround from the $6 billion 
available at the end of 1997 in the midst of its financial crisis.  
A debate is now under way in Korea over how much foreign-exchange reserves it 
should accumulate.  According to the Korea Times, “one group contends that Korea’s 
reserves are “excessive” and has proposed that amounts beyond the optimal level be 
invested abroad.  But the Bank of Korea--currently in charge of managing the reserves--
 3 and its sympathizers, argue that a small, open economy like Korea’s must accumulate 
sufficient reserves to cope with unexpected occurrences like the currency crisis in 1997.” 
(Korea Times, January 17, 2002) 
Those who believe Korea’s reserve holdings are excessive point to the fact that 
some reserves have been accumulated through government bond sales.  Whereas reserves 
earn a current market rate of 2-3 percent, the government bonds carry an interest rate of 9 
percent.  They argue that Korea is paying unnecessarily high interest rates for reserves 
that are excessive to begin with.  They favor the establishment of a government-
appointed body that would manage Korea’s external assets and debts and invest reserves 
into profitable assets overseas.   
Others dismiss the notion that Korea’s reserves are excessive.  They point out that 
it has been only four years since Korea was near bankruptcy, a number of Korean 
companies still face bankruptcy or low profitability, large amounts of foreign funds still 
move in and out of local stocks and other financial investments, and Korea cannot rule 
out the possibility of a future crisis.   According to the Korea Times, the supporters of 
large reserve holdings believe “the costs linked to overcoming a currency crisis are 
astronomical while the gains to be made from the productive investment of the reserves 
will be quite small.” (Korea Times, January 17, 2002.)    
Foreign policy uncertainties also appear to be a factor in Korea’s decision to hold 
sizeable reserves.   Many Korean economists maintain that Korea needs more than $500-
1,000 billion in reserves for use if and when the two Koreas unite.  (Korea Times, 
January 17, 2002).  Should there be an escalation in inter-Korean tensions instead, they 
believe South Korea would also need a lot of reserves to buffer it from difficulties such as 
a panic by foreign investors.  Thus some argue that Korea needs a very large stockpile of 
international reserves regardless of the future foreign policy outcome. 
From the ongoing debate in Korea, it seems that the desire to protect the Korean 
economy from external shocks is the driving force behind the rapid accumulation of 
international reserves.   Domestic political uncertainties have not been sufficiently 
important to keep reserves at a more modest level. 
 4 3.  Empirical Evidence 
We wish to investigate whether political considerations play a significant role in 
determining international reserve holdings over and above the standard explanatory 
variables.  Most previous empirical work on international reserve holdings relies on the 
buffer stock model to guide the specification.
2  The buffer stock model says that central 
banks should choose a level of reserves to balance the macroeconomic adjustment costs 
incurred in the absence of reserves with the opportunity cost of holding reserves.  
Reserve holdings turn out to be a stable function of just a few variables—the adjustment 
cost, the opportunity cost and reserve volatility.  In practice, empirical work has generally 
excluded the opportunity cost measure because interest rate data on the alternative yield 
to reserves are unavailable for many developing countries and the measure is 
insignificant for developed ones.   
A common strategy is to assume actual reserve holdings are proportional to 
optimal reserves up to an error that is uncorrelated with right-hand side variables.  The 
estimating equation then becomes: 
 
    (1)         ln(
Rt
Xt
) = α0 +α1ln(St)+α 2lnσ t + α3 ln(Ct)+ εt 
 
The LHS of (1) is the log of actual reserve holdings (R), valued in U.S. dollars and 
expressed as a ratio of X, where X is usually the U.S. GDP deflator.  Since developing 
countries have minimal gold holdings, their international reserves are usually measured 
as “reserves minus gold” and include convertible foreign exchange, the unconditional 
drawing right with the IMF, and special drawing rights. The RHS of (1) shows observed 
reserves depending on a scaling variable (S), the volatility of international transactions 
(σ) and adjustment costs (C).   
The scaling variable measures the size of international transactions and is 
generally represented by real GDP, real GDP per capita, or population size.  It should 
                                                 
2 For example, see Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981), Frenkel (1983), Edwards (1983), 
Lizondo and Mathieson (1987) and Flood and Marion (2001).  An alternative view relies 
on the monetary approach to the balance of payments and relates changes in international 
reserves to changes in money demand.  See Edwards (1984) and Elbadawi (1990).  See 
International reserves thus provide insurance in case of default.  For empirical evaluation 
on the insurance value of international reserves, see Ben-Bassat and Golllieb (1992). 
 5 enter with a positive coefficient.  The volatility of international receipts and payments is 
usually measured by the standard deviation of the trend-adjusted changes in reserves over 
some previous period.  Since higher reserve volatility means that reserves hit their lower 
bound more frequently, the central bank should be willing to hold a larger stock of 
reserves in order to incur the cost of restocking less frequently.  Volatility should enter 
with a positive coefficient.
3  
The marginal propensity to import was initially proposed as a proxy for 
adjustment costs.  Early researchers noted that an external disequilibrium induced by a 
decline in export earning could be corrected by a decline in output.  The smaller the 
marginal propensity to import, the greater the output decline needed to bring about the 
correction.  The cost of output adjustment could be saved if the central bank financed the 
external deficit with its international reserves.  Thus the cost of adjustment in the absence 
of reserves would be inversely related to the marginal propensity to import. (See Heller, 
1966).  In empirical work, the average propensity to import was used instead of the 
marginal propensity and its coefficient frequently turned out to be positive.  The 
propensity to import was then reinterpreted to measure the economy’s openness and 
vulnerability to external shocks.  The positive coefficient suggested that the demand for 
reserves increases as the economy faces greater external vulnerability. 
While equation (1) is the benchmark specification of reserve holdings based on a 
buffer stock model, some researchers have considered additional variables.  For example, 
Flood and Marion, (2001) and Disyatat and Mathieson (2001) found that the volatility of 
the effective exchange rate is an important determinant.  The choice of exchange-rate 
regime should affect international reserve holdings.  Greater exchange-rate flexibility 
should reduce the demand for reserves since central banks no longer need a large reserve 
                                                 
3 Alternative volatility measures have also been used. Edwards (1985) used the volatility 
of export receipts. Flood and Marion (2001) showed that the reserve volatility measure is 
contaminated because it combines the volatility of a standard reserve increment that is 
possibly distributed conditionally normally with large upward and downward jumps in 
reserves associated with reserve restocking or speculative attacks on reserve stocks, 
respectively.   When upward jumps in reserves dominate, this volatility measure imparts 
a positive bias to the coefficient on reserve volatility. They chose to use a measure of 
fundamentals volatility.  
 6 stockpile to maintain a peg or enhance the peg’s credibility.  The coefficient on 
exchange-rate volatility should therefore be negative. 
Table 1 presents benchmark regressions, where the dependent variable is the log 
of reserves relative to either the U.S. price deflator, the country’s public and publicly-
guaranteed external debt, or the country’s broad money supply (M2).
4  It also reports 
results for regressions  enhanced by adding political variables. The original panel data set 
consisted of 137 developing countries over the 1970-99 period, but missing data reduced 
the sample to 122 countries or less over the 1980-99 period, depending on the choice of 
explanatory variables.  A data appendix describes variable definitions and sources. 
Regression (1) is the benchmark regression when reserves are deflated by the US 
deflator and it confirms findings from earlier studies.  The scale variables, population size 
and real GDP per capita, are positive and highly significant.  Volatility, represented here 
by the volatility of real export receipts, and vulnerability to external shocks, measured by 
the country’s openness, are also positive and highly significant.
 5   Greater exchange-rate 
variability significantly reduces reserve holdings.  These five variables account for over 
70 percent of the variation in observed reserve holdings without fixed effects.  With fixed 
effects, the version reported in Table 1, they account for 88 percent of the variation.  The 
benchmark regression clearly illustrates that reserve holdings increase with volatility and 
the economy’s growing vulnerability to external shocks. 
Regressions (3) and (5) present benchmark regressions when reserves are scaled 
by external debt and broad money, respectively.  Although the explanatory variables now 
explain less of the variation in reserve holdings, the results are qualitatively similar.  
More populous and higher per capita-income countries hold more reserves, greater 
volatility and vulnerability to exogenous shocks significantly increase reserve holdings, 
                                                 
4 Benchmark regressions where reserves are expressed as a ratio of GDP or import 
months are not reported.  The idea behind expressing the dependent variable as a ratio is 
that the authorities may choose to treat the ratio as the policy variable of interest. 
 
5 Terms-of-trade volatility may represent a more exogenous measure of uncertainty than 
the volatility of export receipts.  By itself or interacted with openness, terms-of-trade 
volatility is not a significant determinant of reserve holdings when reserves are deflated 
by the U.S. price deflator or scaled by a country’s external debt.  However, terms-of-trade 
volatility interacted with openness has a positive and highly significant effect when 
reserves are scaled by the country’s broad money, import months or GDP.  
 7 and greater exchange-rate flexibility reduces reserve holdings, though not significantly in 
all cases. 
Regressions (2), (4) and (6) add political variables to the benchmark regressions. 
We considered several political variables--the probability of a government leadership 
change by constitutional means, the probability of a government leadership change by 
unconstitutional means, and an index of political corruption.
6   Since the probability of a 
leadership change by unconstitutional means was never a significant explanatory variable 
in any regression, we report regressions without it.
7   The corruption index is based on a 
survey of foreign investors conducted by the International Country Risk Guide.  A higher 
value indicates that high government officials are more likely to demand special 
payments and that illegal payments are expected to a greater degree throughout lower 
levels of government in connection with import and export licenses, exchange controls, 
tax assessment, police protection, or loans.  Because there are fewer observations on the 
political variables (the data cover only 65 countries over the 1985-96 period), the sample 
size is reduced.
8   
Political factors do influence reserve holdings.  When reserves are deflated by the 
U.S. price deflator (regression (2)) or expressed as a ratio of external debt (regression 
(4)), a greater probability of leadership change and greater political corruption both 
significantly reduce international reserve holdings.  When reserves are expressed as a 
ratio of broad money (regression (6)), political corruption and political uncertainty are 
again negatively correlated with reserve holdings though only the corruption index is 
                                                 
6 The probabilities  of constitutional and unconstitutional leadership change are estimates 
from a multinomial logit that uses as explanatory variables the length of time in power, 
leader age, a political regime dummy, an election time dummy, regional dummies, and 
the number of previous leadership exits.  The logit was conducted by David LaBlang 
(2000), who kindly agreed to share his results.  The political corruption index is from the 
International Country Risk Guide and was kindly provided to us by Hamid Davoodi. 
 
7 The insignificance of this variable may be due, in part, to the fact that it was positively 
correlated with the corruption index and negatively correlated with real GDP per capita 
and openness. 
 
8 The benchmark regressions with the reduced sample size are substantially similar to the 
ones reported in Table 1. 
 8 significant.  We thus have some empirical support for the notion that political uncertainty 
or corruption effectively reduce the return to holding international reserves. 
We next turn to a model that tries to rationalize these findings.  The model departs 
from the buffer-stock approach and instead emphasizes the importance of international 
reserves and external debt in providing intertemporal consumption and distortion 
smoothing. The model incorporates features of developing economies and takes into 
account the possibility of opportunistic behavior.  
 
 
4.  The Model 
We consider a two-period model of an emerging-market economy.  The economy 
experiences productivity shocks that create a volatile tax base.  It faces inelastic fiscal 
outlays and finds it costly to collect taxes.   The economy can borrow internationally in 
the first period, but because there is some chance it will default in the second period, it 
faces a credit ceiling.   
The central bank actively targets the stock of reserves.  Even so, a variety of 
exchange-rate arrangements are possible, such as a fixed exchange rate or a managed 
float, because the balance sheets of the central bank and treasury are consolidated and the 
net taxes paid by consumers are determined as a residual.
9    
 
Output 
Suppose that productivity shocks occur only in the second period.  Then GDP 







where ε  is a productivity shock defined in the range  δ ε δ ≤ ≤ − ;  δ ≤ 0 , with a 
corresponding density function  f (ε).   
                                                 
9 This structure would also apply to the operation of export stabilization funds, such as 
Chile’s cooper fund. 
 
 9  
International Borrowing 
The emerging market can borrow in international capital markets.  Suppose it 
borrows B in period 1 at a contractual rate r, so it owes (1+ r)B in period 2.  If it faces a 
bad enough productivity shock in the second period, it defaults.  Default is not without 
penalty, however.  International creditors can confiscate some of the emerging market’s 
export revenues or other resources equal to a share α of its output.  We assume that the 
defaulting country’s international reserve holdings are beyond the reach of creditors.
10  
In the second period, the country repays its international obligations if repayment 
is less costly than the default penalty.  The country ends up transferring S2 real resources 
to international creditors in the second period, where: 
 
(2)       S [ 2 2 ; ) 1 ( Y B r MIN ] α + =  ,                    1 0 < <α  
 
Let ε∗  be the value of the shock that causes the emerging market to switch from 
repayment to the default regime:
11  
 
(3)           (1+ r)B =α(1+ε*) 
 
Thus the future net resource transfer to international creditors will be: 
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10 This is a realistic assumption.  For example, on January 5, 2002, The Economist 
reported “[President Duhalde] confirmed that Argentina will formally default on its debt, 
an overdue admission of an inescapable reality.  The government has not had access to 
international credit (except from the IMF) since July.  It had already repatriated nearly all 
of its liquid foreign assets to avoid their seizure by creditors.” (The Economist, p. 29) 
 
11 If the worst possible shock (ε = −δ ) still makes repayment preferable to default, then 
ε* is set equal to −δ . 
 10 Suppose the risk-free interest rate is rf .  The interest rate attached to the country’s 
acquired debt, r, is determined by the condition that the expected return on the debt is 
equal to the risk-free return: 
 
(5)          E[S2] = (1+ rf)B 
 
From (4) we know that the expected return on the debt is the weighted average of the 
default penalty and full repayment, where the weights reflect the probability of each 
outcome: 
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Differentiating (5’), we find that: 
 
(6)          d[B(1+r)]/dB = (1+rf)/Q
  
where  ε ε
δ
ε
d f ) (
*
∫ = Q is the probability of full repayment.  If there is no chance of default, 
 and the country is charged the risk-free rate.  But when there is some chance of 
default, the country is forced to pay a risk premium, since 0
Q=1
< Q<1 implies r> rf . 
 
The Fiscal Story 
     The demand for public goods, such as health, pensions, and defense, is 
assumed to be completely inelastic and set at G .  Public goods expenditures are 
financed, in part, by tax revenues.  Collecting taxes is assumed to be costly. Costs include  
direct collection and enforcement costs as well as indirect deadweight losses associated 
with the distortions induced by taxes.  Like Barro (1979), we model these costs as a non-
linear share of output and let them depend positively on the tax rate.  Thus a tax at rate t 
yields net tax revenue of 
 
(7)                        . 0 " , 0 ' )]; ( [ ) ( ≥ Γ ≥ Γ Γ − = t t Y t T  
 
 11 The term Γ  measures the fraction of output lost because of inefficiencies in the tax 
collection system.  
(t)
Γ(t)is assumed to increase at an increasing rate as the tax rate rises.  
It is convenient to specify the fiscal demand for net tax revenue as a share of 
GDP: 
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Combining (7) and (8), we can express the tax rate as a function of the share of net tax 
revenue in GDP: 
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For example, if the collection cost is quadratic in the tax rate, so that  where 
2 5 . 0 ) ( t t λ = Γ
λ measures the relative inefficiency of the tax system, then 
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The government can acquire international reserves in the first period, let them 
earn the risk-free rate, and spend them in the second period.  One way of acquiring 
reserves is through sovereign borrowing. Even if reserves are acquired as the counterpart 
of private-sector borrowing, full sterilization by the central bank implies an ultimate swap 
of sovereign debt for reserves.  Another way of accumulating reserves is through 
taxation.  Higher taxes depress domestic absorption and generate a bigger current-account 
surplus in the first period.  In the second period, reserves may be spent to finance 
repayment of the international debt and government expenditures. In a two-period model, 
there is no need to hold reserves beyond the second period.  Thus the terminal demand 
for reserves is zero. 
The government faces the following budget constraints: 
 
 12 (12)               
T 1 = G + R − B;
T2 = G + S2 − (1+ rf)R
 
 
In the first period, spending on public goods and reserve accumulation must be financed 
by taxes and foreign borrowing.  In the second period, spending on public goods and debt 
repayments must be financed by taxes and available reserves.   
 
Optimization 
We now wish to evaluate the optimal foreign borrowing and demand for 
international reserves by a country with a costly tax collection system and some chance 
of defaulting. Subject to the government budget constraints in (12), the policy maker 
chooses the foreign debt and international reserves to acquire in the first period in order 
to maximize the intertemporal utility of consumers:  
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In (13), consumer preferences are characterized by a conventional time-separable utility, 
where ρ is the discount rate.  Consumer spending in each period is merely output net of 
taxes, where taxes include collection costs: 
 
(14)              Ci =Yi[1−ξi − Γ(t(ξi))]; i =1,2
12 
 
Given the definition of output in (1), consumer spending in period 1 is 
C1 =[1−ξ1 −Γ(t(ξ1))] while consumer spending in period 2 is 
C2 = [1 −ξ2 −Γ(t(ξ2))] (1+ε)
i C ∂ ∂ /
.  For future reference, it is useful to note that the marginal 
cost of public funds, − , can be inferred from (14) to be:  i T
 
                                                 
12 Applying (7) and the definition of  ξ, we know ξYi = Ti = [ti −Γ]Yi.  Thus t i i i Γ + =ξ , 
and C ) 1 ( ) 1 ( i i i i i i Y t Y Γ − − = − = ξ . 









while from (8) and (12) we know that:      
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and  S 2 is given by (5’). 
The first-order condition that determines optimal borrowing is  
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which can be rewritten as 
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The first-order condition that determines optimal first-period reserve holdings is: 
 
(18)       0 ) ( )} ( 1 ){ ( ' )
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If the country fully repays its foreign debts (Q = 1), optimal borrowing equates 
the expected present value of the marginal cost of public funds in the two periods.  It 
therefore provides expected smoothing of the tax burden over time.  Put differently, the 
policy maker borrows in the first period up to the point where the gain in the consumer’s 
                                                 
13 This result follows from the observation that dCi/dTi = −Yi[1+ Γ ']dξi/dTi and 
i i i Y dT d / 1 / = ξ . The marginal cost of public funds can also be written as 
[] dt d / 1 / 1 ) ( ' 1 Γ − = Γ + ξ .  Since  i i i t Γ + =ξ , we know that 
.  Rearranging terms, we find that  ) / )( i i d dt ξ / i i dt dΓ ( 1 ) ( i ξ + =
) / i i dt dΓ
1 /
'
i i d dt ξ Γ + =
1 /[ 1 / i i d dt − = ξ =  1 ) ( ' ξ Γ + . 
 14 first-period marginal utility is equal to the expected loss of second-period marginal utility 
that comes from raising future taxes to repay the debt.   
If a bad enough shock reduces future output so much that the country defaults 
(i.e., if Q < 1), then the country pays the default penalty.  In the absence of international 
reserve holdings to finance second-period public expenditures, the country also needs to 
raise taxes.  Condition (17) implies that external borrowing alone is insufficient for 
achieving intertemporal smoothing of the tax burden in all states of nature. 
Figure 1 illustrates the first-order condition that must be met in order to maximize 
the intertemporal utility of the consumer.  It plots the present value of the expected 




'(ξ2) [] , as a function of the 
second-period productivity shock.  The curve is downward sloping. The reason is two-
fold.  First, more positive output shocks generate higher output and lower the marginal 
cost of obtaining public funds.  Second, higher levels of consumption lead to diminishing 
marginal utility, lowering the marginal cost of taxes.  Observe that an increase in 
borrowing shifts up the curve.  It raises the marginal cost of funds in the second period, 
expanding the range of shocks where default occurs, and it reduces the marginal cost of 
funds in the first period.  Optimal borrowing equates the expected second-period 
marginal cost of public funds evaluated over the distribution of shocks that induce full 
repayment [point N in Figure 1] to the cost of public funds in the first period, illustrated 
by the horizontal broken line.   
Figure 2 characterizes optimal borrowing.  Specifically, schedule   is the 
first-period marginal cost of raising public funds, u .  Curve 
1 MC
)} ( 1 ){ ( ' 1
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14  Optimal borrowing is 
characterized by the intersection of both curves. 
                                                 
14 While curve   is always sloping upward, curve  1 MC 2 MC may be downward sloping, as 
higher B reduces the range of full repayment.  The second-order condition for 
 15   In the absence of sovereign risk, Q = 1 and the first-order condition for optimal 
borrowing simplifies to:  
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Optimal borrowing equates the expected cost of public funds across time.  The left-hand 
side of (17”) captures the utility gain in the first period associated with funding one unit 
of fiscal expenditure by borrowing instead of taxes.  The right-hand side measures the 
expected utility loss of raising future taxes in order to repay the first-period borrowing.
15   
If the consumer is risk neutral and if rf  = ρ, optimal borrowing allows for intertemporal 
smoothing of the tax burden, as in Barro (1979).  In these circumstances the marginal 
cost of raising one unit of net tax revenue in the current period equals the expected 
present value cost of raising one unit of net taxes in the future.  
To understand the role of international reserves, we evaluate the impact of the 
first unit of reserves on consumer utility.  Differentiating (18) with respect to reserves, we 
find that  
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Evaluating (19) around an initial equilibrium where R=0 and borrowing is optimal, we 
find that: 
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15Note that raising one unit of net taxes increases the gross tax bill by 1+Γ
'(ξ1).  
Borrowing one unit increases first-period utility by the product of the gross tax saving 
and the marginal utility.    
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Acquiring the first unit of reserves increases utility since it helps cushion the fall in 
second-period consumption should a bad shock trigger default.  The larger the difference 
between first-period and second-period marginal utility when there is a default and no 
reserve cushion, the bigger the gain in utility from having international reserves to draw 
on when there is a default.  
International reserves thus provide insurance.  They help the economy smooth 
consumption intertemporally in the event of default. The combination of optimal external 
borrowing and optimal reserve accumulation permits expected consumption smoothing 
between period one and states of nature in period two when there is either full repayment 
of the foreign debt or default. 
The result in (20) can be illustrated in Figure 1.  Recall that point N represents the 
expected second-period marginal cost of public funds evaluated over the distribution of 
shocks that induce full repayment.  Point D corresponds to the expected second-period 
marginal cost of public funds evaluated over the distribution of shocks that cause default.  
The gain in utility from acquiring the first unit of reserves is proportional to the vertical 
gap between points D and N.   
A country with international reserves can transfer public funds from period one, 
where their marginal cost is low, to states of nature where bad shocks reduce output and 
trigger default.  These are also the states of nature where the marginal cost of public 
funds is high.  Hence, the benefit of holding international reserves is greatest when the 
country has an inefficient tax system and the probability of default is high.
16 
                                                 
16 Figure 1 corresponds only to the equilibrium where R = 0.  Increasing R would impact 
both the location and the shape of the curve tracing the marginal cost of public funds.  
For example, when  ) 1 ( f r R + < G , the marginal cost curve is upward sloping over the 
range of shocks that lead to default.   
 




(21)   
∂B
∂R optimal B
 >  0  .  
 
At the margin, acquiring international reserves increases the optimal amount of foreign  
borrowing.  Obtaining reserves in period one not only makes more resources available in 
period two, but these resources are insulated from second period’s productivity shock.  
The net effect of acquiring reserves is to reduce the need for additional tax revenue in the 
future when there is a default.  Having reserves thus reduces the expected cost of 
obtaining public funds in the future and increases the cost of acquiring public funds in the 
present.  The change in the cost profile encourages more borrowing in the first period.  
In terms of Figure 2, the effect of reserve accumulation is to shift curve 
upwards, and to shift curve    C1 M   C2 M downward, to the dotted curves.  Both effects 
increase optimal borrowing.
18  This process will continue until the optimal level of 
reserves is reached or until B reaches the credit constraint, whichever occurs first.  
Figure 3 illustrates how international reserve holdings increase optimal borrowing 
at the margin. The figure simulates B as a function of R for the case where agents are risk 
neutral and the productivity shock follows a uniform distribution.
19  As long as the 
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18 Figure 2 is plotted for the case where    C2 M  is upward sloping.  Higher R will increase 
B even if    C2 M is downward sloping, as its slope exceeds that of  .  1 C M
19   This simulation plots values of B that solve  
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 18 borrowing constraint is not reached, the process of acquiring reserves will continue as 







.  The optimal R corresponds to the point where the external 
borrowing constraint is reached, at B = α = 0.1.
20  The net effect of increasing reserves is 
to increase the net external debt, B – R, to about 0.065.   
The above discussion suggests that there are strong efficiency reasons for holding 
international reserves.  Apart from any need to hold reserves for exchange-rate 
management, reserves help a country smooth consumption when there is a positive 
probability of default and a binding international credit ceiling.  We now consider how 
political economy factors may undermine efficiency reasons for holding reserves and 
result in reduced reserve holdings. 
 
A Political Economy Story 
We now consider an economy where interest groups compete for additional fiscal 
resources to support their specific agendas.  Realized fiscal expenditure is the outcome of 
this competition.  Interest groups may be represented by cabinet ministers or, in a federal 
system, by the governors of various states or provinces.  We retain our earlier assumption 
that consumer utility can be characterized by (13).  Such will be the case if interest 
groups pursue narrow agendas and their marginal spending does not directly impact the 
representative consumer’s welfare.  The tax consequences of successful lobbying efforts 
will have the usual adverse effect on the consumer’s utility, however. 
The Treasury Minister (TM) is assumed to determine the ultimate fiscal 
allocation.  We assume two types of Treasury Ministers—soft and tough.  A soft one 
accommodates all the fiscal demands of the various interest groups up to the limit 
                                                                                                                                                 
for a given R, where the interest rate r is determined by (5’).   
20   Note that the credit ceiling is reached where Q = 0.  Hence 
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 19 imposed by the contemporaneous budget constraint.  A tough one forces the interest 
groups to adhere to the planned allocation, G .  There is uncertainty in period one about 
the type of Treasury Minister that will serve in period two.  With probability φ the future 
Treasury Minister will be tough. 
The sequence of events is as follows.  In period one, the interest groups determine 
their desired second-period demand for fiscal resources.  At the beginning of the second 
period, the productivity shock and the Treasury Minister’s type are revealed.  A soft TM 
in the second period will divide the maximum available fiscal resources, net of foreign 
debt repayments, among all the interest groups.  In that case, aggregate fiscal expenditure 
and consumption in the second period will be: 
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where t  is the tax rate that maximizes net tax revenue and is obtained by solving 
.  For example, with quadratic collection costs, 
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where T is the maximum net tax revenue attainable [i.e. T m )} ( { m m m t t Y Γ − = ].   
  If the TM is also soft in the first period, fiscal expenditure in period one will equal 
the maximum contemporaneous resources available.  This outcome is the result of 
assuming interest groups have high discount rates and prefer maximizing first-period 
fiscal expenditure.  A soft TM will therefore have no incentive to acquire international 
reserves and carry them over to the future period.  Moreover, a soft TM will borrow in 
the first period up to the external credit ceiling,  ) 1 /( f r + α .  Consequently, first-period 
fiscal expenditure and consumption observed with a soft TM are:  
 
 20  (24)   
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The public finance problem solved by the soft TM has a trivial solution: maximize the 
fiscal outlay in period one.  To do so, the first-period TM sets the tax rate at the peak of 
the tax Laffer Curve, borrows up to the external credit ceiling, and accumulates no 
international reserves.  
  We turn now to the more complex case, where a tough TM in the first period must 
determine the amount of international reserves and foreign debt to acquire in order to 
maximize the expected utility of the representative agent.  The tough TM does not know 
the second-period productivity shock or TM-type, only the distribution of the 
productivity shock and the probability of having a particular TM-type.  The tough TM‘s 
objective is to maximize:  
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Inspection of (25) reveals that whatever choice the tough TM makes about first-period 
external debt and reserve holdings, it will not affect expected future utility should the soft 
TM be in office next period (the last term in (25)). Hence, maximizing (25) delivers first- 
order conditions identical to those derived in the previous section, except that now 








.  The tough TM in the 
initial period must satisfy the first-order conditions: 
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Inspection of (26) and (27) reveals that political uncertainty about whether the future 
Treasury Minister will be soft or tough induces today’s tough TM to reduce the shadow 
real interest rate on borrowing and international reserves from  f r + 1 t o   ) 1 ( f r + φ .  If the 
country operates in the range where saving increases with the real interest rate and 
borrowing depends negatively on its expected cost, the higher probability of a soft future 
governor will lead to higher borrowing and lower international reserves accumulation in 
period 1.  In the Appendix we provide the precise conditions needed to obtain this 
outcome. 
The rationale for holding reserves is to increase tomorrow's buying power.  The 
greater the probability of having a soft TM in the future ( a small φ), the smaller the 
weight attached to the benefit of having high reserves in the future to increase purchasing 
power.  With probability (1− φ) the reserves will be appropriated—or looted-- by a soft 
TM who will distribute them to various interest groups via higher fiscal expenditure.   
Similarly, the greater the probability of having a soft TM in the future, the more 
borrowing a tough TM will undertake today.  Greater borrowing today increases future 
debt service and reduces the resources left for the soft TM to distribute.   
It is interesting to note that the greater the chance of having a soft TM in the 
future, the more likely today’s tough TM will mimic the behavior of a soft TM in the first 
period, reducing optimal reserve holdings and increasing optimal borrowing.  Of course, 
the motivation is different.  A tough TM in the first period chooses fewer reserves and 
more borrowing in the first period to reduce expected future looting.  The absence of 
reserve holdings and high borrowing adopted by the soft TM is the outcome of present 
looting.  Nevertheless, we can conclude that a greater chance of opportunistic behavior 
by future policy makers reduces the demand for international reserves and increases 
external borrowing.  By the same analysis, a greater degree of political corruption 
directly increases the likelihood of looting and leads to reduced reserve holdings. 
 22 5. Conclusion 
  One general point is worth emphasizing.  Political instability and political 
corruption reduce the optimal size of buffer stocks.  This point is illustrated in the context 
of the demand for international reserves, but it is applicable to other stabilization fund 
schemes as well.  Our model described an economy where a higher chance of future 
looting by an opportunistic policy maker reduces the current demand for international 
reserves.  A similar point has been made in the context of a polarized political system, 
where political parties differ in their spending priorities.  A higher probability of losing 
power to the opposing party reduces the saving of the present administration [see Alesina 
and Tabellini (1990) and Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992)].   
  Our empirical work suggests that greater attention should be given to the role of 
political-economy factors in explaining the demand for reserves and the functioning of 
buffer stocks.  We found that the probability of leadership change and political corruption 
influenced the demand for reserves even after controlling for standard determinants and 
fixed effects.  Due to data limitations, we were unable to investigate the effects of 
external threats and internal political polarization on the demand for international 
reserves.
21  Theoretical considerations suggest that external threats should increase 
reserve holdings whereas internal political polarization should decrease them.   
Another issue deserving further attention is the impact of access to international 
borrowing on the demand for reserves.  Indeed, our modeling suggests that international 
borrowing and international reserve accumulation are the simultaneous outcome of 
optimizing decisions. Accounting for international borrowing may require information 
not only about the sovereign risk premium but also about the supply-elasticity of credit 
facing the economy.  Both factors will affect the cost of relying on foreign borrowing to 
smooth adjustment in the face of future adverse shocks.   Addressing these issues is left 
for future work. 
 
 
                                                 
21 Important data sets of political variables, such as Taylor and Jodice (1983) and Banks 
(1985, 1994) have not been extended through the 1990s.  Political measures of external 
foreign policy threats are available only by decade. 
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 25 Appendix 
A higher probability of a soft future administration leads to higher borrowing and 
lower international reserves accumulation in period 1:  
 







We show this will be the case in an internal equilibrium where the complementarily 
between reserves and borrowing is not too great.   
Note that the first-order conditions for determining the behavior of the tough 
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where V is a shortened notation for V .  T | 1st period Tough  |
Thus, 
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Applying (25) we infer that  0 ; 0 ; 0





















.  The second order 
condition for internal optimization implies that D is positive.  This will be the case if the 







) is smaller that the geometric 


















).  Inspection of 
(A4) reveals that a sufficient condition to sign the impact of changing the probability of a 
future soft policy maker is that the complementarity between B and R is low enough.  In 
these circumstances,
22   






                                                 
22 It is easy to confirm that for a given B, a higher return on R would increase the optimal 
demand for R.  Similarly, for a given R, higher expected borrowing costs would reduce 
B.  Due to the complementarity between B and R, there are secondary effects: the 
increase in R triggered by higher returns will increase B, whereas the drop in B induced 
by the higher cost of borrowing will reduce R.  The direct effects will dominate the 
secondary effects only if the complementarity between B and R is not too great.    
 27 TABLE 1:  Determinants of Reserve Holdings 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)             (6) 
 
obs 1954 915    1937 901  1948    914     
countries  122 65    122 65  122    65 
 
dep  var  ln(R/P) ln(R/P) ln(R/Debt)  ln(R/Debt)  ln(R/M2)          ln(R/M2)  
 
lpop  2.1762**  1.6764**  0.6920  0.3325  1.8815**          1.3353** 
  (0.4607)  (0.6124)  (0.5076)  (0.6689)  (0.4345)           (0.5884)       
 
lgpc  1.5436** 1.8111**   0.9378**  1.7638**  0.0763    0.1872 
  (0.2878)  (0.3633)   (0.3571)  (0.4849)  (0.2658)            (0.3680)    
      
lexa  0.2512** 0.1176  0.2467** 0.2355  0.3193**  0.1906 
  (0.1044)  (0.1456)  (0.1126)  (0.1594)  (0.1049)            (0.1482) 
 
limy  0.4954**  0.4976*  0.6075**  0.5096*  0.8664**          1.0990** 
  (0.2020) (0.2675) (0.2330) (0.3075)  (0.1848)    (0.2526) 
 
lneer -0.1065**  -0.1092*    -0.1690**  -0.1220*  -0.0270   0.0404 
  (0.0367) (0.0613)   (0.0394)  (0.0661)  (0.0380)    (0.0638) 
 
corrupt  --- -0.1283**  --- -0.1566**  ---    -0.1086** 
   (0.0442)     (0.0532)      (0,0466)   
 
pol ----  -0,2904**  ---  -0.4030**  ---  -0.2498 
   (0.1481)   (0.1630)      (0.1633) 
 
R 
2  0.88  0.88    0.72  0.73  0.56            0.65 
 
 
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  All regressions 
include fixed effects.  Constant terms not reported. For variable definitions, see the data 
appendix. 
 
A “**” (“*”) indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent (10 percent) level. 
  
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  All regressions 
include fixed effects.  Constant terms not reported. For variable definitions, see the data 
appendix. 
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Marginal cost of public funds and optimal borrowing [R = 0] 
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Marginal cost of public funds, international reserves and optimal borrowing.   
Higher R will shift both curves to the right, from the solid to the broken curves. 








Optimal borrowing as a function of international reserves. 
The simulation corresponds to the case of risk neutral agents, where  
2 . 0 , 05 . 0 , 2 . 0 , 0 , 3 . 1 , 1 . 0 = = = = = = δ ρ λ α G rf
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Data Appendix 
 
R/P = reserves minus gold, deflated by the U.S. GDP deflator (1995=100). Source:   
International Financial Statistics (IMF) for the reserves data and World Economic 
Outlook (IMF) for the deflator. 
 
R/Debt =reserves minus gold scaled by the sum of public and publicly-guaranteed 
external debt.  Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF) for the reserves 
data and Global Development Finance (World Bank) for the debt figures. 
 
R/M2 = reserves minus gold scaled by broad money.  Source:  International Financial 
Statistics.  Broad money is lines 34+35 of IFS converted into millions of US 
dollars using the bilateral exchange rate. 
 
lpop  =  total population, logged.  Source:  World Development Indicators. 
 
lgpc =     real GDP per capita, logged.  Source:  World Development Indicators. 
 
lexa  =    volatility of real export receipts, logged.  Volatility is calculated using annual 
data and is the standard error of a regression of trend real exports.  Source:  
International Financial Statistics. 
 
limy =    the percentage share of imports in GDP, logged.  Source:  World Development 
Indicators. 
 
lneer =   volatility of the nominal effective exchange rate, logged.  Annual volatility is 
calculated using the previous 24 months of data and is the standard deviation of 
the innovation of the percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate. 
Source:  Information System Network, IMF. 
 
corrupt = corruption index based on the perception of foreign investors that high 
government officials will demand special payments or that illegal payments are 
expected throughout the lower levels of government in the forms of bribes 
connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, 
polic protection, or loans.  Source:  International Country Risk Guide.  The 
index ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 6 (least corrupt).  It has been re-scaled by 
multiplying it by 10/6 and for ease in interpreting results, the index has been 
multiplied by minus one so that higher values of the index imply higher 
corruption. 
  
pol  =   the probability of a leadership change by constitutional means.  Source:  LaBlang 
(2000). 
 
Countries: The 137 countries listed in the World Bank’s Global Development Finance 
data set.  